The Commentator

Generally, the accepted approach in batei medrash throughout the ages has been to separate the subjects into two distinct areas of study.  An average day of swimming through sugyos of kim lay bidrabah minay and chazakos does not naturally give rise to discussions of the exact nature of hashgachah or ways to overcome the trait of anger. Consequently, these two disciplines remain distinct and discrete.    

Nonetheless, there have been a respectable number of talmiday chachamim of the highest quality who either explicitly or implicitly advocated a fusion of sorts between the disciplines.  Recently, the world of Torah scholars has seen two of its leaders, the Rav and Rav Kook, propose different models for this endeavor.  In short, while the Rav advocated the extracting of hashkafa from the halakhos and lomdus of the topic,ⁱⁱⁱ Rav Kook saw halakha and hashkafa as two distinct and independent areas that after being fully developed should then be synthesized into a harmonious entity.  I would like to examine and then demonstrate this unique feature of Rav Kook’s derekh halimmud.  

        Though Rav Kook speaks of this idea in various places throughout his works, the most focused passage appears in Orot HaKodesh^iv in the midst of a series of chapters describing our obligation and innate desire to unify different aspects of our avodas Hashem.  One manifestation of this sweeping idea is the unity of halakha and aggadeta, a venture that will not only bear fruits in one’s learning and perception of Torah, but it will also positively reverberate in the world at large.^v

In his work Ishim V’Shittos, R. Shlomo Yosef Zevin records a cogent example of this approach that he personally heard from Rav Kook.^vi  Rav Kook began his sicha by describing the essential difference between the states of war and peace; namely that the former is a temporary and fleeting state while the latter is eternal in nature.  After elaborating on this distinction he flawlessly moves into the halakhic realm and points out that it can be used to resolve an anomaly about the kohen mashoo’ach milchamah.  While there is normally a concept of yerushah for posts of stature (assuming that the son is “fitting to fill the place of his father”), the Gemara^vii[1] derives from a pasuk that this is not the case by the kohen mashoo’ach.  Rav Kook explained that since yerusha represents an eternal and continuous chain, it would be incongruous to apply it to a position that oversees an impermanent phenomenon such as war.

Using this methodology we might gain a new dimension of understanding in some classic chakiros.  Though generally a person is held accountable for his actions, there are certain circumstances where the halakha allows a person to leave the scene with impunity.  Examples of these categories include sinning under duress (onnes) or without being cognizant of one’s activities (misasek).  In each of these scenarios commentators raise queries about the level to which these pturrim extend; does the mitigating factor simply allow the person to avoid punishment or might it penetrate deeper and undercut the definition of this action as a halakhic “maaseh adam.”  In classical sources various supports are raised, questions are asked and answered, and more nuanced suggestions are offered, but the fundamental analysis revolves around these issues.^viii 

Based on the Rav Kook’s approach we might be able to add another layer to the debate.  It seems reasonable to suggest that the definition of a ma’aseh adam should depend on whether or not the performer is using the faculty that is essential to his humanity - his tzelem elokim.  A true spread of the spectrum of interpretations offered for this term is beyond the scope of this article, so we will be forced to suffice with two.  The Rambam,^ix together with many others defines the tzelem elokim as human intellect. In contrast to R. Meir Simcha of Dvinsk^x posits that it is in man’s free will that his similarity to God is manifest.  Entering this information into the original formula of tzelem elokim = maaseh adam we may conclude that an action bereft of one’s intellect or free choice may fall short of the requirements for maaseh adam.  If we now return to analyze the exemptions of onnes and misasek we will realize that an action under duress is done with full cognizance of the situation but is lacking free-will, while the opposite is true for a case of misasek.  The result of this approach is to transpose the hashkafic categories created by the Rambam and R. Meir Simcha in respect to tzelem elokim, into a chakira we can use to define onnes and misasek.   

Though Rav Kook does not provide sources for his sweeping assertions, I think that in this instance even a person not versed in Kabbalah can locate the kernels from which these beliefs grew.  We are taught that the Torah is not only the optimal guide for living but is also the work in which Hashem “clothed” his essence.  If we are to combine this concept of koodsha brich hoo voraisa chad hoo with the knowledge of Hashem’s unity we perforce reach the conclusion that the Torah is supposed to express that oneness as well.  Following the same line of thought, the broader assumption that achdut amongst the various facets in one’s avodas Hashem is an ideal might be traced back to our basic obligation of Imitatio Dei.  This is not meant to imply that Rav Kook was naively unaware of the constant state of conflict in which religious individuals find themselves, but that despite his acute awareness of these internal clashes, which he attests to personally experiencing, he still felt that unity and harmony should be guiding ideals.

The one who said my soul is torn spoke well, of course it’s torn.  We can’t envision someone who isn’t torn.  Only the inanimate is whole.  But a human being has contradictory longings, a permanent war is waged within him and all his effort is to unify the antinomies in his soul by an encompassing idea, in whose greatness and sublimity all is gathered and brought together in utter harmony.  Of course this is just an ideal towards which we can yearn, no mortal can reach it, but by our efforts we draw closer and closer to it and this is what the Kabbalists call “Unification.”^{xi xii}

Yosef Bronstein is a Junior in YC 

ⁱ Nedarim 35b, Yerushalmi Pe’ah 2:4

ⁱⁱ For example, Sifray Ekev Piska 12, that derives the obligation to study Aggadta from pesukim and Piska 13 that advises this study for one who seeks to gain knowledge of God.   

ⁱⁱⁱ The Halakhic Mind part 4 chapters 3-4.

^iv pg. 25.  I must admit to never even attempting to systematically learn Orot HaKodesh as it is one of Rav Kook’s more Kabbalisitc works.

^v It is important to note that Rav Kook himself, at least in his written teshuvos, did not apply this methodology on a regular basis.  I once heard Rabbi Magnus, the current Mashgiach of Yeshivat Merkaz HaRav, justify the “regular” study of Gemara that prevails in the hallowed halls of Rav Kook’s own yeshivah by commenting that it is not our responsibility or right to establish new darkei ha-limmud.  I am personally of the opinion that the approach of Rav Kook can be a potentially fruitful endeavor but should in no way supersede the intensive learning of Gemara b’iyunn in its most traditional sense.

^vi page 234.  R. Zevin beautifully describes the aura of the se’udah shlishit in Rav Kook’s home where the sicha was delivered. 

^vii Yoma 72b

^viii In regard to misasek see Shut R. Akiva Eiger Mahdura Kama siman 8, Kovetz Shiurim 2:23:, Asvan De’oraissa siman 24.  In regard to onnes see Kovetz Shiurim Kesubos simanim 1-11.

^ix Yesoday Torah 4:8, Moreh Nevuchim 1:1

^x Meshech Chochma Braishit 1:26.

^xi Ha-Machshavah Ha-Yisraelit pg. 13.  The translation is from Yehudah Mirsky’s dissertation on Rav Kook’s early life and thought.

^xii In general, I would like to echo the words of some of our Gedolay Achronim in asserting that “bati rak li-hai’ir” as the author is not an authority in Torah in general or Rav Kook in particular.

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