The Commentator

I am warning you of an intellectual development whose tenets shake the very assumption of human understanding.  Followers are known for not only adopting its radical beliefs about knowledge, but for abandoning traditional morals, ethics, and beliefs. Already a calling card of the scholarly elite, even the most innocent student lives in its imprint, and - when seeking to impress or fit in - will consciously employ its radical tools.

Subscribers to this philosophy implicitly deny objective paths to knowledge.  They claim that as much as one might attempt honest research or open-minded discussion, their subsequent opinions are less the fruits of a clearheaded investigation than the predictable afterbirth of a preset, subjective perspective.  In other words, we gaze at the world through a distorting lens and, thus, our every observation can be traced back to those silly glasses.  Similarly, adherents of this viewpoint reject such labels as “True,” “False,” “Right,” “Wrong,” “Makes Sense,” or “Inconsistent” - all standpoints are possible.  Thus, they invest no time in discerning the “right” opinion on any issue, in fact, scorning those who do.  For after all, how does one decipher Truth, what presumptuous tools can one possibly use?  Does such a thing even exist?  Put yourself in anyone else’s perspective and, trust me, you would agree with them too.

These axioms also include a revolutionary approach to texts, namely, that anything can be read any way.  Texts shift according to their reader and his or her particular traditions, context, agenda, sexuality, etc.   The Communist Manifesto for you might be the direct opposite of the Communist Manifesto for me, or better yet, the Communist Manifesto of you a year from now- and all of those reads are equally truthful.  Thus, two conclusions: first, the impossibility of discerning the author’s original intent and more importantly, the disregard for it.  After all, texts are but catalysts for meaning- a meaning far deeper and more complex than any individual author.

But forget about texts - this is the nature of reality itself.  We live in a world of insufficient information.  The precious few lines of data we succeed in acquiring explode into an infinite cacophony of divergent and contradictory explanations, none of which can ever be proven with perfect veracity.  Such is human knowledge.  And such are a few central motifs of this emerging intellectual phenomenon.

To what rising, modern, revolutionary credo do I refer?  What method of intellectual inquiry backs such dicta? Lomdus, of course.  If it sounded more like Postmodernism, why - thank you - that’s my very point: Lomdus is Postmodern.

I can pinpoint four dominant themes in Lomdus.ⁱ   I used them to write the above paragraphs, which to their credit, also describe strong trends in Postmodernism.  Tell me, isn’t this eerie?

1.  The assumption that a particular shita stems from pre-supposed, conceptual models.  The Ran’s opinion on, say, yibum is not the product of the two textual proofs he records or the three kashas that he quotes, but a pre-supposed conceptual conviction.  Likewise, although he is discussing a specific and localized case, lomdus will assume his stance is part of a broader conceptual bias.  You hear it best in the prevalent terminology: “we can explain the Makhloket like this, the Ramban sees Yibum as an extension of the previous marriage, whereas the Ran sees it as a new union” - apparently this particular halakhic debate is actually the effect of pre-supposed, pre-existing outlooks on a massive Torah topic.   And apparently, even though neither the Ramban or Ran mention these concepts, we are able to detect the real motivation behind their shita.

2.  The assumption that each conceptual model is equally valid.  After establishing the Ran’s and Ramban’s abstract models, would a Magid Shiur dare take the next step and ask which opinion actually makes more sense?  No! - who even has the hava amina that there exists a single Truth!  Is the Magid Shiur concerned with why the Ramban chose that alternate approach?  No!  Treat it as a given, unchangeable, instinctive decision!  Might he present a dialectic of proofs and counterproofs, so typical of the pre-Brisk Torah world?  No!  I promise you, nestled within each Rishon’s respective point of view, anything can be answered up.  After all, asking who’s actually right is so baalebatish.

3. An indifference towards textual analysis.  There are those that hang on every word of a Tosfot, pin-pointing the exact thrust of a particular phraseology.  There are those that contrast divergent Rashis in the hope of uncovering the Kunteros’s subtle commentary. Not so with lomdus.  A lamdan simply isn’t concerned, for a combination of two reasons: firstly, he doubts the success and integrity of such a method. (He would be the first to tell you that his “objective” interpretation of a Rishon always manages to produce a lomdishe hakira and in the few cases where it failed him he would respond with the ubiquitous “nu-nu.”) Secondly, the Tosfot’s original intent is not actually significant: texts are the written springboard for conceptual meanings - a meaning far deeper and more complex than any individual commentator.

4. An attitudinal embrace of Talmudic ambiguity.  Lomdus works because the Gemara doesn’t.  How so?  The Talmud presents us with tiny scraps of information which explode into a cacophony of alternative explanations.  (Ok, say migo works.  As a hanhaga?  As a beirur?  L’fturei m’shvua?  With ha’aza?  Without hazaka?  On a taanat shema? The list goes on.)  The Gemara teases us by drawing a single dot on the Talmudic X-Y graph - and of course, only an infinite amount of equations fit the description. An innocent observer might find this news disenchanting, but in it lamdanim rejoice.  They construct a philosophy of Talmud Torah upon the foundation of multiple truths.  Some claim Truth constitutes a wide range of contradicting options while others prefer to imagine a single Truth, but give up any hope of arriving at it, ostensibly eliminating Truth from their intellectual experience. Some even ride the wave of not-knowing to shores not necessary to being a lamdan.  For one, the method of R. Aharon Lichtenstion, our generation’s most prominent lamdan, claims that identical terms can refer to non-identical concepts. (“migo” over here refers to one conceptual model, whereas “migo” a few lines later refers to another.)ⁱⁱ  In the end nothing can be assumed as Talmudic Truth, and ultimately, we can never know anything with perfect veracity.  For if we could, it might be worthwhile to understand rishonim on their own terms, to weigh the benefits of each independent idea, and to employ textual analysis to arrive there. 

It is not this essay’s aim to link the historical developments of Postmodernism and Lomdus.ⁱⁱⁱ  Likewise, it is not this essay’s ambition to weigh the merits of one movement because of its similarities to another.  (In other words, I’m not saying Lomdus is bad!)  Rather, assuming that proposed similarities exist, I contemplate their repercussions on the intellectual life of the YU student.

The popular fallacy of a monolithic, all-answering Judaism demands revision.  So often I hear YU students talk of “the Torah perspective” on an issue or ask for “what Judaism has to say” regarding this or that topic. These discussions disregard the complex and contradictory nature of Jewish texts.  Unfortunately, the “Torah answer” is all too often a big, fat question mark - the type that haunts the Truth seeker’s memories and lurks in the shadows of his brief successes.   Jewish history attests to this fact: no generation practices the Judaism of its predecessors, for every time and place struggles to piece together its own consistent, meaningful, and unique religious formula.  Lomdus teaches us to accept these facts when we practice Jewish learning, its high time we remember them when we approach Jewish life decisions.

Ben Greenfield is a Sophomore in YC

ⁱ This article discusses the only Lomdus I am familiar with, namely that practiced by R. Aharon Lichtenstein and continued/expanded upon by his students.  Nonetheless, many points I make apply to earlier or more conservative versions thereof.  Likewise, I don’t claim ownership of this definition of Lomdus, I merely describe that which I have experienced.  If this style of Lomdus has a completely different meaning to the reader, I would be surprised, but nonetheless have little with which to reply.

ⁱⁱ I am not attacking the integrity of such a maneuver, which in my insignificant Talmudic opinion, fits wonderfully with the text and opens up valuable windows of interpretation.  Rather, I claim it fits the Lomdishe preference for ambiguity in place of clarity.

ⁱⁱⁱ I hope to address Postmodernism’s effects on quasi-traditional Orthodox Hashkafot in a forthcoming article.

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