2008 Woodie Awards
Justification and Limitations of Interfaith Dialogue
Walter S. Wurzburger
Issue date: 3/8/05 Section: Features
- Page 1 of 1
Rabbi Walter S. Wurzburger occupied a unique position within the American Orthodox community. He was one of the few talmidim of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik who interacted intimately with him both in the practical rabbinate-beginning with his first decade of service in Boston (1942-1953), and as a primary student of the Rav's Halakha and philosophy. This special relationship corresponds to his dual role as a significant figure in the American rabbinate and as a major intellectual force. For that reason he functioned uniquely as a faithful and trustworthy institutional and intellectual representative of Orthodoxy in our discussions with heterodox Jews and with various Christian bodies. The essay here reprinted, by permission of Mrs. Naomi Wurzburger, presents a Torah perspective on Jewish-Christian dialogue to the Synagogue Council of America. [Shalom Carmy]
At the outset of this discussion on the ground rules for Christian-Jewish relations, I wish to clarify my own ground rules pertaining to participation in this intra-Jewish dialogue. Since I am no way competent or authorized to present any official position, I merely speak as an individual. I must confess, however, that my reactions to the issues have been strongly influenced by Rabbi Soloveitchik's article on "Confrontation" (Tradition, Summer 1965) and the subsequent elaboration of his views which was adopted as the official platform of the Rabbinical Council of America.
In view of the charge of "moral isolation" that has so often been hurled against Orthodoxy, I wish to emphasize that I welcome opportunities for inter-religious cooperation on matters where joint activity is feasible. Obviously, no one can speak for orthodoxy in general. But it certainly is not the case that Orthodoxy necessarily advocates a ghettoization of the Jewish community. There is simply no justification for the assertion of a Christian writer who maintains that "we now believe to a man that Judaism can survive only behind ramparts and that improved Catholic attitudes to the Jews and Judaism would weaken the sense of being besieged and might lead to the crumbling of the ramparts." (Hargrove, The Star and the Cross, p. 210) Far from urging withdrawal into the sheltering walls of a spiritual or psychological ghetto, we maintain that under present conditions involvement of the Jewish community in the social, political, and economic concerns of mankind represents a religious imperative. But it must be stated categorically that, insofar as the religious individual is concerned, activities of this nature are not of purely secular character, but - as Rabbi Soloveitchik pointed out in an important footnote to his article that has apparently been completely glossed over by some of his critics - they constitute a fulfillment of a religiously motivated and sanctioned mandate. When religious communities address themselves to the so-called secular realm, their policies should be founded not upon a purely secular ethic but upon a philosophy that looks upon man as the bearer of the divine image. When a truly religious dimension is injected by men of faith into the social and economic issues, they can no longer be viewed from a purely utilitarian or pragmatic perspective. It is difficult to see why those advocating interreligious dialogue on doctrinal matters find themselves constrained to belittle this form of interreligious cooperation and suggest that this would reduce "religious institutions to A.C.L.U. chapters with steeples." When Jews and Christians embark on joint social action, they do so not merely qua fellow citizens of a secular society but as members of faith communities seeking the implantation of their socio-religious message.
One might expect that, in an age where the very relevance of religion is so often questioned, religionists would seek to reclaim the area of social concern rather than totally abandon it to secularists. At a time when even the Christian community desperately seeks more involvement in the "secular city," joint action in the social and economic fields represents a far more fruitful area of religious colloquia devoted to the discussion of purely theological positions where Judaism and Christianity have relatively little in common. It must be borne in mind that Judaism and Christianity are two distinct faith communities that cannot be brought together under the umbrella of a so-called common Judeo-Christian religious tradition. Our opposition to this term must however not be misconstrued as total indifference to the religious values of Christianity. In our attitudes, we are certainly closer to the Christian than to the secularist and we obviously have more in common with Christianity than with religions such as Buddhism or Hinduism. Maimonides, who was far from being over-impressed with the virtues of Christianity, noted in a famous responsum (Teshuvot Ha-Rambam, No. 377) that the Christian attitude towards the Bible entitles Christians to a preferential treatment over other non-Jews with respect to the propriety of receiving Torah instruction. This ruling of Maimonides merits special attention because of late the rather startling view has been advanced that we do not even have our Bible in common with Christian; in as much they refuse to read it in light of our oral Tradition. Our effort to bolster the uniqueness of Judaism need not express itself in the attempt to downgrade the positive religious values of Christianity. There is nothing gained by maintaining that we have no special ties with Christianity over and above the ties of the common humanity that connect us with all human beings regardless of religious belief. Rabbi Moshe Rivkes, writing in the Be'er Hagolah (Choshen Mishpat 425,5) pointing to our common religious teachings, attributes great significance to the fact that the Christians, unlike ancient pagans, "believe in creatio ex nihilo and in the Exodus and other main principles of religion." In Rabbi Rivkes' view, Christians are not merely removed from the category of idolatry, but a special positive value is attached to those of their views which they share with Judaism.
But while recognizing the values of Christianity, we must exercise great caution lest we endorse features of Christianity which cannot be justified from our perspective. Just because Christianity is willing to assign a special role to Judaism, we need not return the compliment and accord - as did Franz Rosenzweig, James Parkes, Hans Joachim Schoeps and Jacob Petuchowski - a special place of honor to Christianity. We completely reject the "two covenants theory" according to which Judaism is the faith for the Jew, while Christianity is the faith of the non-Jew. It is one thing to recognize many positive features of the Christian faith and to see in it an extremely valuable ally in the struggle against secularism, but an entirely different matter to accept the Christian claim that Jesus fulfills a unique function in the redemption of the world - be it only for the non-Jew. We may feel flattered, especially after thousands of years of persecutions where we have been defamed as "perfidious" Jews that Christianity now wishes to become -- as Krister Stendahl puts it - "honorary Jews." But we cannot follow the logic of Professor Lowell Streiker of Temple University, who in his recent article in the Christian Century (February 8, 1967) asks "If, and why many modern Jews so assert, Christianity has a role to play in redemptive history, does it make sense to regard this role so essentially outside of the covenant community of Israel?"
Even if we adopt Maimonides' position as expressed in Hilkhot Melakhim and concede to Christianity an important place in redemptive history, it still does not follow at all from this premise that Christians are involved in the special covenant of Israel. By the same token, with all our appreciation of Christianity as an avenue to God available to the non-Jewish world, we must not gloss over the fact that the Trinitarian faith still falls short of our universal religious ideals. While the belief in the Trinity - classified by the Halakhah as Shituph - may not be regarded as downright prohibited to the non-Jew, we still cannot recommend it as the ideal way in which the non-Jew should relate himself to God.
We should point out that we regard belief in the Trinity as such an aberration that we would rather have a Jew remain an agnostic or atheist than accept these doctrines which for a Jew would involve apostasy or idolatry. It has been suggested by Arthur Gilbert that Jews must come to grips with the theological significance of Christianity because it arose out of Judaism. On the basis of the genetic fallacy we could also argue that Judaism must come to grips with the theological meaning of Marxism because it also arose out of the matrix of Jewish messianic thinking and was first developed by individuals of Jewish descent. It must not be overlooked that whereas Judaism presents a theological problem, if not a challenge, for Christianity, the values and insights of Judaism can be presented with complete disregard for Christianity. It is only with respect to the proper approach to the Christian community that Christian theological dogmas need be considered by us at all. In the light of shifting theological positions of Christianity it is quite possible that we can modify certain attitudes to Christianity. Just as during the Middle Ages rabbis ruled that Christians no longer qualified as idolaters it may be possible in the light of new theological positions adopted by Christianity that they may no longer even be guilty of Shituph. By the same token, we may question whether some of these new theological stances may not imply that certain Christian groups may have to forfeit certain privileges they enjoy now over non-believers. But questions of this nature, however important they may be with respect to our relationship vis-a-vis the non-Jewish community, do not figure at all in the development of our own theological position where we must insist on complete independence. We cannot enter into any deals with respect to matters of theology. We regard as offensive the mere suggestion that in return for the abandonment of missionary activities on the part of the Christian world, Jews should be prepared to acknowledge Christianity as the valid approach to the non-Jewish world. No matter how tempting the overtures of the Christian world, we cannot accept the proposal of Gregory Baum that we acknowledge Christians as the people of the covenant instead of merely classifying them as "the good people of the nations."
Matters of religious faith do not lend themselves to negotiation where in order to arrive at a mutually agreeable settlement both sides are ready to make concessions. Christians, especially after Auschwitz, may have compelling moral reasons to reconsider the propriety of theological tenets which resulted in the "teaching of contempt" with all its disastrous implications. But Jews have no corresponding legacy of theological hatred which they have to revise, and it is difficult to see, no matter how positive Christians become in their evaluation of Judaism, how Jews can go beyond this stage where Trinitarian belief is tolerated for non-Jews as an advancement over paganism. It is inconceivable that Jews should compromise on their eschatological ideal that all of mankind would ultimately accept the pure faith in a living God that is shown of all such distortions as contained in the Christian doctrine of Incarnation or Trinity.
It has been said by the proponents of dialogue that exposure to the values of a different faith tends to confirm or purify one's own religious convictions. There can be no doubt that one's theological thinking can be stimulated and refined by acquaintance with the work of theologians of a different faith. But the example of recent theological writing also indicates that it is extremely difficult to guard against the intrusion of categories which are foreign to Jewish thought. Perhaps equally disastrous is the tendency on the part of Jewish thinkers to over-react against Christian categories to such an extent that Judaism emerges as an inverted form of Christianity. With the operation of an over-sensitive defense mechanism, authentic Jewish categories are frequently dismissed as Christian simply because they are also encountered in Christian theological writings. Because of the delicate situation involved, extreme caution has to be taken to maneuver a safe middle course between the two extremes and only properly qualified specialists should devote themselves to the study in depth of non-Jewish theologies. In the light of the utter incommensurability of the respective theological commitments, it is difficult to see how fruitful theological dialogue on matters affecting the contents of one's belief can really take place between Judaism and Christianity. While the two respective faith communities share many common problems - especially with respect to the very possibility of holding a religious belief in our present secular climate - nonetheless when it comes to the matters of the content of belief there really exists no common universe of discourse. Those who are committed to a particular religious faith as the embodiment of their ultimate concerns cannot listen to "other religions" with a view to deriving from them insights that would serve as a corrective to the inadequacies and shortcomings of their own faith. Morris Raphael Cohen pointed to an essential defect besetting many philosophical systems when he maintained that philosophers are usually right in what they see and wrong in what they fail to see. But a religious faith is not a philosophical system that is subject to correction by another system. Religious faith represents an ultimate commitment to the insights and values of a particular faith and therefore cannot be modified or corrected in the light of another system.
Notwithstanding the fact that by now aversion to doctrinal dialogue is no longer confined to orthodox circles, it is still fashionable to attribute the opposition to dialogue to the rigidity that allegedly is the hallmark of the orthodox mentality. It has been charged that this supposedly deplorable lack of "openness" prevents orthodoxy from grasping the great religious merits of a dialogue in which one is open to the values, beliefs and commitments of another faith. Thus Hans Joachim Schoeps extols the existential dialogue in which "conflicting beliefs are not abolished; instead the conflicts arising from what is acknowledged through faith are brought into sharp relief, there is real understanding on the third realm, that of spirit and truth from which religion develops." (The Jewish-Christian Argument, p.127-127)
Underlying this faith in the dialogue is the assumption that various particular formulations of religious truth are but inadequate attempts to appropriate a higher but rather elusive religious truth. But this is precisely what is challenged by the Orthodox position. It is the commitment to an individual particular faith that provides the believer with the ultimate standards of value. As Emil Brunner has pointed out, the believer does not use his particular faith as one of the many different modes of striving for an ultimate truth. Speaking of Christianity he maintained that "Christian faith would cease to be faith if it wanted to ground the truth of this affirmation on a universal truth. The very nature of revealed faith involves reversing the classification of universal and special because a particular, e.g. revelation, is regarded as ranking above every universal." (Philosophy of Religion, p. 16)
There is no such thing as an essence of religion which can be extracted from a variety of religious affirmations. Nor is it feasible without doing violence to the integrity of religious faith to accept the notion of the idealists that the "idea" of religion is only partially realized in the various historic religions. It is precisely because modern dialogue stipulates this mutual openness that it is far more dangerous to a genuine faith commitment than the admittedly futile inter-faith disputations of the Middle Ages. Dialogue is not a purely academic scholarly exercise dedicated to a purely objective study and analysis of religious phenomena. What is intended by the modern religious dialogue is the creation of a climate where different believers encounter each other as believers (not simply as scholars) with a view to deepening each other's faith experience. It is questionable whether any genuine believer can really enter into such a dialogue and forego all missionary objectives. Can a Jew enter into a dialogue without at least subtly conveying his aversion to such notions as Trinity and the Incarnation? Let it be granted that a Jew has no real desire to convert his partner in dialogue to Judaism. But even in a pluralistic climate would he not prefer the Christian to abandon his distortions of monotheism and accept a more refined version of faith in God. A Jew may prefer Christianity over paganism, but sooner or later he would attempt to wean the Christian away from those Christian dogmas which offend Jewish sensitivities. And if it is difficult for a Jew who operates within a particularist universe of discourse to forego all missionary efforts, how much more so for the Christian who clings to a kerygmatic faith with universalistic ecumenical goals. It must also be remember that with the notable exception of a few theologians (Tillich, Niebuhr, James Parkes, Roy Eckardt, etc.) the mainstream of Christian thinking still retains the hope for the ultimate conversion of the Jews. For that matter, many liberal Christian theologians maintain that the very kerygmatic character of Christianity would be compromised if the eschatological hope for conversion of the Jews would be surrendered. It is next to impossible to draw a clear-cut line of demarcation indicating where dialogue stops and proselytization begins. At which point should we break off discussions because we have crossed over from the domain of legitimate dialogue into the forbidden zone of outright missionary activities.
None of the arguments in favor of inter-faith dialogues can compete in popularity with the promise of improved inter-group relations. It is widely held that such interfaith activity is indispensable for the promotion of real goodwill between the various religious communities. Obviously, Jewish secular organizations advocate and support the dialogue so lavishly because of their legitimate interest in the reduction of intergroup tension. Because of this preoccupation within the elimination of conflict between faith communities, there is hardly any consideration given to the question whether and to what extent interfaith dialogue on the popular level would be a factor in eroding the already tenuous bonds which still connect the marginal Jew within the Jewish community.
Writing several years ago ("The Christian Jewish Dialogue," The Jewish Spectator, March-April 1965), Professor Petuchowski foresaw that in the wake of the Christian-Jewish dialogue we are bound to lose some of the uncommitted Jews who hover on the periphery of Jewish life. But he felt that in such an eventuality we would lose only "nominal" Jews, not those who are genuine believers of Judaism as a religion, and that such a loss would be outweighed in gains for the cause of genuine religious commitment. However, many of us regard the defection even of non-committed Jews, be they even Jews without any Judaism at all, as a serious catastrophe that must be prevented at all costs. We would certainly prefer a secular Jew to remain an agnostic than become a believer in Christianity. One might, therefore, seriously question the propriety of procedures which might result in improved interfaith relations by would lead to serious defections from the Jewish community. After all, in matters of pikuach nefesh, dangers to life - and this category includes the danger to one's spiritual identity - Judaism maintains that to save one individual is equivalent to saving the whole world. Moreover, we even challenge the validity of the basic premise of the secular defense organizations that interfaith dialogues are necessarily conducive to improved intergroup relations. Obviously, when conducted in frankness, candor and depth, and not geared to the requirements of professional goodwill experts who would supply us with a special syrup of sweet reasonableness to dissolve all religious differences in a bland mixture of harmony and peace, dialogues may actually accentuate religious divisiveness.
In the give and take of an honest discussion one cannot shy away from statements that may offend the sensitivities of the adherent of another faith. It might be helpful to recall what Edward Flannery said in The Anguish of the Jews. According to Flannery, Jews also bear a measure of responsibility for the development of anti-Semitism 1) because of our separatist tendencies and 2) - and this is significant in our context here - because we were guilty of proselytization. Obviously, any presentation of a religious point of view which insists upon the universal applicability of some of its doctrines leaves itself open to the charge of proselytization.
Basically, if Jews engage in dialogue with Christians, they find themselves treading a treacherous and narrow path similar to that of the rabbis of old who were coerced into disputations. Today we do not fear violent reprisals for the wrong answers, but the human reactions may not have changed so much over the centuries. What have we go gain from putting ourselves voluntarily into the position our ancestors were forced into? Instead of promoting good will, such confrontation is apt to destroy it. It therefore seems that the best avenue to foster improved inter-faith activities is to concentrate on those areas where the various religious communities are truly united in a genuine community of interest and commitment. It is in the area of meaningful cooperation directed to the social realm that religion can provide the most effective answer to the growing secularization of society which endangers Judaism and Christianity alike.
The Commentator thanks Rabbi Shalom Carmy, Chairman of Yeshiva College's Judaic Studies deparment, for recommending the article and writing the introduction.
At the outset of this discussion on the ground rules for Christian-Jewish relations, I wish to clarify my own ground rules pertaining to participation in this intra-Jewish dialogue. Since I am no way competent or authorized to present any official position, I merely speak as an individual. I must confess, however, that my reactions to the issues have been strongly influenced by Rabbi Soloveitchik's article on "Confrontation" (Tradition, Summer 1965) and the subsequent elaboration of his views which was adopted as the official platform of the Rabbinical Council of America.
In view of the charge of "moral isolation" that has so often been hurled against Orthodoxy, I wish to emphasize that I welcome opportunities for inter-religious cooperation on matters where joint activity is feasible. Obviously, no one can speak for orthodoxy in general. But it certainly is not the case that Orthodoxy necessarily advocates a ghettoization of the Jewish community. There is simply no justification for the assertion of a Christian writer who maintains that "we now believe to a man that Judaism can survive only behind ramparts and that improved Catholic attitudes to the Jews and Judaism would weaken the sense of being besieged and might lead to the crumbling of the ramparts." (Hargrove, The Star and the Cross, p. 210) Far from urging withdrawal into the sheltering walls of a spiritual or psychological ghetto, we maintain that under present conditions involvement of the Jewish community in the social, political, and economic concerns of mankind represents a religious imperative. But it must be stated categorically that, insofar as the religious individual is concerned, activities of this nature are not of purely secular character, but - as Rabbi Soloveitchik pointed out in an important footnote to his article that has apparently been completely glossed over by some of his critics - they constitute a fulfillment of a religiously motivated and sanctioned mandate. When religious communities address themselves to the so-called secular realm, their policies should be founded not upon a purely secular ethic but upon a philosophy that looks upon man as the bearer of the divine image. When a truly religious dimension is injected by men of faith into the social and economic issues, they can no longer be viewed from a purely utilitarian or pragmatic perspective. It is difficult to see why those advocating interreligious dialogue on doctrinal matters find themselves constrained to belittle this form of interreligious cooperation and suggest that this would reduce "religious institutions to A.C.L.U. chapters with steeples." When Jews and Christians embark on joint social action, they do so not merely qua fellow citizens of a secular society but as members of faith communities seeking the implantation of their socio-religious message.
One might expect that, in an age where the very relevance of religion is so often questioned, religionists would seek to reclaim the area of social concern rather than totally abandon it to secularists. At a time when even the Christian community desperately seeks more involvement in the "secular city," joint action in the social and economic fields represents a far more fruitful area of religious colloquia devoted to the discussion of purely theological positions where Judaism and Christianity have relatively little in common. It must be borne in mind that Judaism and Christianity are two distinct faith communities that cannot be brought together under the umbrella of a so-called common Judeo-Christian religious tradition. Our opposition to this term must however not be misconstrued as total indifference to the religious values of Christianity. In our attitudes, we are certainly closer to the Christian than to the secularist and we obviously have more in common with Christianity than with religions such as Buddhism or Hinduism. Maimonides, who was far from being over-impressed with the virtues of Christianity, noted in a famous responsum (Teshuvot Ha-Rambam, No. 377) that the Christian attitude towards the Bible entitles Christians to a preferential treatment over other non-Jews with respect to the propriety of receiving Torah instruction. This ruling of Maimonides merits special attention because of late the rather startling view has been advanced that we do not even have our Bible in common with Christian; in as much they refuse to read it in light of our oral Tradition. Our effort to bolster the uniqueness of Judaism need not express itself in the attempt to downgrade the positive religious values of Christianity. There is nothing gained by maintaining that we have no special ties with Christianity over and above the ties of the common humanity that connect us with all human beings regardless of religious belief. Rabbi Moshe Rivkes, writing in the Be'er Hagolah (Choshen Mishpat 425,5) pointing to our common religious teachings, attributes great significance to the fact that the Christians, unlike ancient pagans, "believe in creatio ex nihilo and in the Exodus and other main principles of religion." In Rabbi Rivkes' view, Christians are not merely removed from the category of idolatry, but a special positive value is attached to those of their views which they share with Judaism.
But while recognizing the values of Christianity, we must exercise great caution lest we endorse features of Christianity which cannot be justified from our perspective. Just because Christianity is willing to assign a special role to Judaism, we need not return the compliment and accord - as did Franz Rosenzweig, James Parkes, Hans Joachim Schoeps and Jacob Petuchowski - a special place of honor to Christianity. We completely reject the "two covenants theory" according to which Judaism is the faith for the Jew, while Christianity is the faith of the non-Jew. It is one thing to recognize many positive features of the Christian faith and to see in it an extremely valuable ally in the struggle against secularism, but an entirely different matter to accept the Christian claim that Jesus fulfills a unique function in the redemption of the world - be it only for the non-Jew. We may feel flattered, especially after thousands of years of persecutions where we have been defamed as "perfidious" Jews that Christianity now wishes to become -- as Krister Stendahl puts it - "honorary Jews." But we cannot follow the logic of Professor Lowell Streiker of Temple University, who in his recent article in the Christian Century (February 8, 1967) asks "If, and why many modern Jews so assert, Christianity has a role to play in redemptive history, does it make sense to regard this role so essentially outside of the covenant community of Israel?"
Even if we adopt Maimonides' position as expressed in Hilkhot Melakhim and concede to Christianity an important place in redemptive history, it still does not follow at all from this premise that Christians are involved in the special covenant of Israel. By the same token, with all our appreciation of Christianity as an avenue to God available to the non-Jewish world, we must not gloss over the fact that the Trinitarian faith still falls short of our universal religious ideals. While the belief in the Trinity - classified by the Halakhah as Shituph - may not be regarded as downright prohibited to the non-Jew, we still cannot recommend it as the ideal way in which the non-Jew should relate himself to God.
We should point out that we regard belief in the Trinity as such an aberration that we would rather have a Jew remain an agnostic or atheist than accept these doctrines which for a Jew would involve apostasy or idolatry. It has been suggested by Arthur Gilbert that Jews must come to grips with the theological significance of Christianity because it arose out of Judaism. On the basis of the genetic fallacy we could also argue that Judaism must come to grips with the theological meaning of Marxism because it also arose out of the matrix of Jewish messianic thinking and was first developed by individuals of Jewish descent. It must not be overlooked that whereas Judaism presents a theological problem, if not a challenge, for Christianity, the values and insights of Judaism can be presented with complete disregard for Christianity. It is only with respect to the proper approach to the Christian community that Christian theological dogmas need be considered by us at all. In the light of shifting theological positions of Christianity it is quite possible that we can modify certain attitudes to Christianity. Just as during the Middle Ages rabbis ruled that Christians no longer qualified as idolaters it may be possible in the light of new theological positions adopted by Christianity that they may no longer even be guilty of Shituph. By the same token, we may question whether some of these new theological stances may not imply that certain Christian groups may have to forfeit certain privileges they enjoy now over non-believers. But questions of this nature, however important they may be with respect to our relationship vis-a-vis the non-Jewish community, do not figure at all in the development of our own theological position where we must insist on complete independence. We cannot enter into any deals with respect to matters of theology. We regard as offensive the mere suggestion that in return for the abandonment of missionary activities on the part of the Christian world, Jews should be prepared to acknowledge Christianity as the valid approach to the non-Jewish world. No matter how tempting the overtures of the Christian world, we cannot accept the proposal of Gregory Baum that we acknowledge Christians as the people of the covenant instead of merely classifying them as "the good people of the nations."
Matters of religious faith do not lend themselves to negotiation where in order to arrive at a mutually agreeable settlement both sides are ready to make concessions. Christians, especially after Auschwitz, may have compelling moral reasons to reconsider the propriety of theological tenets which resulted in the "teaching of contempt" with all its disastrous implications. But Jews have no corresponding legacy of theological hatred which they have to revise, and it is difficult to see, no matter how positive Christians become in their evaluation of Judaism, how Jews can go beyond this stage where Trinitarian belief is tolerated for non-Jews as an advancement over paganism. It is inconceivable that Jews should compromise on their eschatological ideal that all of mankind would ultimately accept the pure faith in a living God that is shown of all such distortions as contained in the Christian doctrine of Incarnation or Trinity.
It has been said by the proponents of dialogue that exposure to the values of a different faith tends to confirm or purify one's own religious convictions. There can be no doubt that one's theological thinking can be stimulated and refined by acquaintance with the work of theologians of a different faith. But the example of recent theological writing also indicates that it is extremely difficult to guard against the intrusion of categories which are foreign to Jewish thought. Perhaps equally disastrous is the tendency on the part of Jewish thinkers to over-react against Christian categories to such an extent that Judaism emerges as an inverted form of Christianity. With the operation of an over-sensitive defense mechanism, authentic Jewish categories are frequently dismissed as Christian simply because they are also encountered in Christian theological writings. Because of the delicate situation involved, extreme caution has to be taken to maneuver a safe middle course between the two extremes and only properly qualified specialists should devote themselves to the study in depth of non-Jewish theologies. In the light of the utter incommensurability of the respective theological commitments, it is difficult to see how fruitful theological dialogue on matters affecting the contents of one's belief can really take place between Judaism and Christianity. While the two respective faith communities share many common problems - especially with respect to the very possibility of holding a religious belief in our present secular climate - nonetheless when it comes to the matters of the content of belief there really exists no common universe of discourse. Those who are committed to a particular religious faith as the embodiment of their ultimate concerns cannot listen to "other religions" with a view to deriving from them insights that would serve as a corrective to the inadequacies and shortcomings of their own faith. Morris Raphael Cohen pointed to an essential defect besetting many philosophical systems when he maintained that philosophers are usually right in what they see and wrong in what they fail to see. But a religious faith is not a philosophical system that is subject to correction by another system. Religious faith represents an ultimate commitment to the insights and values of a particular faith and therefore cannot be modified or corrected in the light of another system.
Notwithstanding the fact that by now aversion to doctrinal dialogue is no longer confined to orthodox circles, it is still fashionable to attribute the opposition to dialogue to the rigidity that allegedly is the hallmark of the orthodox mentality. It has been charged that this supposedly deplorable lack of "openness" prevents orthodoxy from grasping the great religious merits of a dialogue in which one is open to the values, beliefs and commitments of another faith. Thus Hans Joachim Schoeps extols the existential dialogue in which "conflicting beliefs are not abolished; instead the conflicts arising from what is acknowledged through faith are brought into sharp relief, there is real understanding on the third realm, that of spirit and truth from which religion develops." (The Jewish-Christian Argument, p.127-127)
Underlying this faith in the dialogue is the assumption that various particular formulations of religious truth are but inadequate attempts to appropriate a higher but rather elusive religious truth. But this is precisely what is challenged by the Orthodox position. It is the commitment to an individual particular faith that provides the believer with the ultimate standards of value. As Emil Brunner has pointed out, the believer does not use his particular faith as one of the many different modes of striving for an ultimate truth. Speaking of Christianity he maintained that "Christian faith would cease to be faith if it wanted to ground the truth of this affirmation on a universal truth. The very nature of revealed faith involves reversing the classification of universal and special because a particular, e.g. revelation, is regarded as ranking above every universal." (Philosophy of Religion, p. 16)
There is no such thing as an essence of religion which can be extracted from a variety of religious affirmations. Nor is it feasible without doing violence to the integrity of religious faith to accept the notion of the idealists that the "idea" of religion is only partially realized in the various historic religions. It is precisely because modern dialogue stipulates this mutual openness that it is far more dangerous to a genuine faith commitment than the admittedly futile inter-faith disputations of the Middle Ages. Dialogue is not a purely academic scholarly exercise dedicated to a purely objective study and analysis of religious phenomena. What is intended by the modern religious dialogue is the creation of a climate where different believers encounter each other as believers (not simply as scholars) with a view to deepening each other's faith experience. It is questionable whether any genuine believer can really enter into such a dialogue and forego all missionary objectives. Can a Jew enter into a dialogue without at least subtly conveying his aversion to such notions as Trinity and the Incarnation? Let it be granted that a Jew has no real desire to convert his partner in dialogue to Judaism. But even in a pluralistic climate would he not prefer the Christian to abandon his distortions of monotheism and accept a more refined version of faith in God. A Jew may prefer Christianity over paganism, but sooner or later he would attempt to wean the Christian away from those Christian dogmas which offend Jewish sensitivities. And if it is difficult for a Jew who operates within a particularist universe of discourse to forego all missionary efforts, how much more so for the Christian who clings to a kerygmatic faith with universalistic ecumenical goals. It must also be remember that with the notable exception of a few theologians (Tillich, Niebuhr, James Parkes, Roy Eckardt, etc.) the mainstream of Christian thinking still retains the hope for the ultimate conversion of the Jews. For that matter, many liberal Christian theologians maintain that the very kerygmatic character of Christianity would be compromised if the eschatological hope for conversion of the Jews would be surrendered. It is next to impossible to draw a clear-cut line of demarcation indicating where dialogue stops and proselytization begins. At which point should we break off discussions because we have crossed over from the domain of legitimate dialogue into the forbidden zone of outright missionary activities.
None of the arguments in favor of inter-faith dialogues can compete in popularity with the promise of improved inter-group relations. It is widely held that such interfaith activity is indispensable for the promotion of real goodwill between the various religious communities. Obviously, Jewish secular organizations advocate and support the dialogue so lavishly because of their legitimate interest in the reduction of intergroup tension. Because of this preoccupation within the elimination of conflict between faith communities, there is hardly any consideration given to the question whether and to what extent interfaith dialogue on the popular level would be a factor in eroding the already tenuous bonds which still connect the marginal Jew within the Jewish community.
Writing several years ago ("The Christian Jewish Dialogue," The Jewish Spectator, March-April 1965), Professor Petuchowski foresaw that in the wake of the Christian-Jewish dialogue we are bound to lose some of the uncommitted Jews who hover on the periphery of Jewish life. But he felt that in such an eventuality we would lose only "nominal" Jews, not those who are genuine believers of Judaism as a religion, and that such a loss would be outweighed in gains for the cause of genuine religious commitment. However, many of us regard the defection even of non-committed Jews, be they even Jews without any Judaism at all, as a serious catastrophe that must be prevented at all costs. We would certainly prefer a secular Jew to remain an agnostic than become a believer in Christianity. One might, therefore, seriously question the propriety of procedures which might result in improved interfaith relations by would lead to serious defections from the Jewish community. After all, in matters of pikuach nefesh, dangers to life - and this category includes the danger to one's spiritual identity - Judaism maintains that to save one individual is equivalent to saving the whole world. Moreover, we even challenge the validity of the basic premise of the secular defense organizations that interfaith dialogues are necessarily conducive to improved intergroup relations. Obviously, when conducted in frankness, candor and depth, and not geared to the requirements of professional goodwill experts who would supply us with a special syrup of sweet reasonableness to dissolve all religious differences in a bland mixture of harmony and peace, dialogues may actually accentuate religious divisiveness.
In the give and take of an honest discussion one cannot shy away from statements that may offend the sensitivities of the adherent of another faith. It might be helpful to recall what Edward Flannery said in The Anguish of the Jews. According to Flannery, Jews also bear a measure of responsibility for the development of anti-Semitism 1) because of our separatist tendencies and 2) - and this is significant in our context here - because we were guilty of proselytization. Obviously, any presentation of a religious point of view which insists upon the universal applicability of some of its doctrines leaves itself open to the charge of proselytization.
Basically, if Jews engage in dialogue with Christians, they find themselves treading a treacherous and narrow path similar to that of the rabbis of old who were coerced into disputations. Today we do not fear violent reprisals for the wrong answers, but the human reactions may not have changed so much over the centuries. What have we go gain from putting ourselves voluntarily into the position our ancestors were forced into? Instead of promoting good will, such confrontation is apt to destroy it. It therefore seems that the best avenue to foster improved inter-faith activities is to concentrate on those areas where the various religious communities are truly united in a genuine community of interest and commitment. It is in the area of meaningful cooperation directed to the social realm that religion can provide the most effective answer to the growing secularization of society which endangers Judaism and Christianity alike.
The Commentator thanks Rabbi Shalom Carmy, Chairman of Yeshiva College's Judaic Studies deparment, for recommending the article and writing the introduction.