Hazal's Vision of Truth

"'Masters of assemblies' (Kohelet 12:11)-these are the wise scholars who sit in various groups and occupy themselves with the study of Torah. These defile and these purify, these prohibit and these permit, these disqualify and these declare fit. Lest one say: "how can I ever learn Torah now?" Scripture states that 'all' are 'given from one shepherd.' One G-d gave them, one leader proclaimed them from the mouth of the master of all matters, Blessed is He, as is written: 'And G-d Spoke all these words.' (Exodus 20:1)"

-Hagiga 3b

I couldn't help but keep these words of Hazal in mind as I read the questions Ben Greenfield raises regarding Judaism's conception of truth-and he does raise some important questions. How does a doctrine of multiple truths differ from postmodernism? How could God want two things from us at once? With much due respect to Ben, though, he unfortunately seems to have missed what the wealth of traditional sources on the subject indicates. Just as in lamdus or halakha we would not invent our own chiddushim without checking in with our classical sources, we cannot allow ourselves to interpret fundamental statements of Jewish philosophy without seeing how our tradition has understood them over time. I hope that through careful consideration we can see that many of his criticisms are unnecessary and misguided, as we find a deeper conception of ailu ve-ailu that is both philosophically mandated and taught to us through the mekorot of our mesorah1.

In discussing the Talmudic dictum "Ailu ve-ailu divrei elokim hayim" ("These and those are the words of the Living God")2, Ben's article rejects any notion of multiple truths in hashkafa as a form of postmodern relativism, writing that "these arguments matter to G-d and one side is wrong." However, Ben sets up a straw man, oversimplifying a philosophy of multiple truths to mean that in disputes G-d "suddenly disappear[s] with a thunderous, 'Oh, I don't care- do whatever the heaven you like.'"

Frankly, it is no nod to postmodernism whatsoever to recognize that we live in a world in which no one can penetrate his or her subjective veil. Philosophers struggled to understand the nature of knowledge for centuries before postmodernism evolved. The first thing any student of epistemology discovers is how little we can claim to know about anything in any absolute sense, and how colored our claims of knowledge often are. In fact, throughout the history of epistemology, very little has been decisively proven as knowledge, beyond the Cartesian givens (i.e. my own existence and my sensory experiences). Any other claims invariably enter a realm of epistemological dispute, as we wade through a sea of subjective knowledge, striving towards truth yet bound by the distinct perspectives through which we view the world. Additionally, modern perceptual psychology affirms the subjective nature of our experience. Recognizing this feature of our world represents a simple act of intellectual honesty on our part, and nothing more.

Keeping in mind the different viewpoints our world encompasses, we can begin to understand ailu ve-ailu as our Sages teach it to us. In discussing the above passage of ailu ve-ailu in Eruvin, the Ritva tells that the French Talmudic scholars were asked how both sides of an argument could possibly represent God's will. They responded, based on a midrash3, that when Moshe ascended on high to receive the Torah, he was shown 49 aspects (panim) towards forbidding and 49 aspects towards permitting each matter. When he asked God about this, God answered that these matters will be handed down to the sages of each generation to decide. As the Ketzot HaChoshen writes in the introduction to his work, the Torah was handed over to the human intellect for interpretation. Indeed, as Ben writes, "G-d has one Will:" the will of the Living God is that we determine halakhic/hashkafic truth ourselves with the tools we have been given4.

It is true that (unlike postmodernism) Judaism does start with a set of givens and does not accept the halakhic or hashkafic opinion of every John Doe off the street as ailu ve-ailu." Nonetheless, Hazal saw that any issue in halakha has differing aspects and perspectives inherently present within it. In Be'er HaGolah5, Maharal likens this phenomenon to Aristotelian physics, which states that all matter in the world consists of four basic elements (earth, wind water and fire) mixed in different combinations. Just as (according to this doctrine) every material object contains some proportion of each element but only one dominant element, so too any halakhic question contains valid arguments towards different sides and (usually) one dominant side among them. After all, as Maharal writes there: "Even if an object is defiled, it is impossible that it will have no aspect towards purity….And men are divided in their intellects, and it is impossible that the intellects of all men will follow one route…and thus, each and every person sees one aspect according to his intellectual lot." A second side of an argument does not merely, as Ben claims, "represent a very good, sufficiently efficient way to bring G-d's presence into our world" that nonetheless "is wrong." Rather, each side bears truth, and each of us may perceive differently which truth outweighs the other.

Ben's essay claims that "saying two factual opposites are concurrently correct intimates an irrational approval of contradiction." No. Saying that disparate arguments each bear levels of truth honestly recognizes the complexities of the world around us, and the limitations we each have. If we don't recognize these facts, what do we do instead with all the serious questions about truth raised by epistemology and, yes, by postmodernism?

It is not only the job of the Sages to see all the sides present in any matter-all legitimate, all real, and all true-and only then to decide which side is dominant. The ability to engage in this process is also a prerequisite to reach the highest levels of Torah scholarship. The Gemara in Masechet Sanhedrin 17a declares that we "may appoint to a Sanhedrin only one who knows how to purify a sheretz according to the Torah." Let's keep in mind that the sheretz is unquestionably defiled according to Torah law, case closed, no questions asked. It should be utterly clear to us from this passage alone that ailu ve-ailu most certainly is not "a very specific meta-Halakhic feature," as Ben's article suggests. There is no equal weight to both sides here in practice; a sheretz is tamei. And yet, to gain entrance to the highest order of hakhamim, one must truly understand the svarot with which we could declare the sheretz pure.6 Further Gemarot7 tell of scholars who could purify the sheretz in one hundred different ways. On the operative level, we may only follow one side in a halakhic dispute, but we can never deny that more than one side exists. Yes, as Ben notes in arguing that truth is monolithic, "God does not want us to murder." God also declared the sheretz tamei.

It might be tempting to think, as Ben writes, that "the Rishonim…refused to tolerate a differing opinion- they fought a Milkhemet Hashem... Clearly, if you can bring proof for your shita, it is not one opinion in a care bear world of AA, it is Right." Perhaps, though, we should first look at what those Rishonim themselves actually wrote about their arguments -for example, Ramban's introduction to the work he not-so-incidentally titled Milkhemet Hashem: "And you, reader of my book, do not say in your heart that in my eyes my answers to HaRav Rabbi Zerachia z"l [the Ba'al HaMe'or] are all victorious answers that clearly force you to give in despite stubborn resistance, such that you then glory in yourself if you find where to doubt one of them…for the matter is not so. All students of our Talmud know that no makhloket in understanding it has final proofs."

So does this mean that we are a bunch of wishy-washy relativists, and that Hashem answers with a "no comment" when we decide how to live our lives? Heaven forbid that we should interpret ailu ve-ailu like this! Rather, when understood properly, the subjectivist approach of "elu v' elu" represents empowerment and responsibility.

R' Tzadok HaKohen M'Lublin 8makes a fascinating observation on the Gemara in Yoma 75b. In the incident the Gemara there relates, R' Akiva offers such a radical interpretation of Scripture that R' Yishmael directs his students, "Go out and tell Akiva, 'Akiva, you have erred!'" R' Tzadok points out that R' Akiva's interpretation could not have been a total error; obviously, from R' Akiva's own perspective, he was correct and R' Yishmael in error. And yet, notes R' Tzadok, R' Yishmael still had the right to declare from his position, "Akiva, you have erred!"

After all, as the Gemara itself states in Nida 20b, "A judge has nothing but what his eyes see." R' Yishmael undeniably saw reality as he saw it, and could see it no other way. His words do not merely represent an opinion or a random choice between two potential truths, but rather the very real way in which he viewed the world. To declare anything other than, "Akiva, you have erred" would have been dishonest of him, irrespective of how things might look from R' Akiva's shoes.

Two ideologies can both contain truth in theory. Yet when I must decide which I will accept, I have an obligation to follow what I see as true, judging situations with the tools I have. Ailu ve-ailu does not represent any apathetic openness to all options; it mandates my responsibility to follow the truth as I see it, once I have struggled through the various possibilities. Rather than representing a free-for-all, ailu ve-ailu makes me personally responsible for seeking the truth. 9

Seen in this light, I have to point out the difficulties with Ben's belief regarding what ailu ve-ailu should mean (though again, we should already feel wary about an interpretation that lacks a basis in-and even runs counter to-our classical sources). In legal cases in which two decisions fit within our source texts, Ben writes that a "decision - a personal selection between two respectable courses- morphs into law itself." Has ve-halila that our system of law depends upon mere personal selection, and that it does not matter which judgment we render-even between two textually legitimate options. Such a notion should upset us far more than any hints of postmodernism. A judge has an obligation to root through svarot, struggling to glimpse truth, eventually arriving at the way that he earnestly sees the situation at hand.10 Anything less would be a distortion and mockery of justice, and anything more would demand a level of objectivity to which we are not privy in this world.

Yes, life would be simpler if we state that truth really is monolithic, and that God really does have only one concrete, practical will in halakha/haskafa. But try telling that to R' Eliezer after he was told "lo ba-shamayim hi" ("[Torah] is not in the Heavens") and excommunicated despite a Heavenly voice declaring that he is correct in all halakhic matters11.

In short, Ben's portrayal of ailu ve-ailu misconstrues it, and thus rejects it for the wrong reasons. He correctly notes that ailu ve-ailucan be and has been misapplied at times to embrace or justify all views. However, this is not what multiple truths and ailu va-ailu actually mean, and their potential abuse does not warrant throwing aside a couple thousand years of secular and Jewish philosophy. It should also be obvious at this point that Hazal's ailu ve-ailu worldview never means that we eventually "deny the artificially constructed notion of Truth itself." Instead, the notion of truth becomes all the more precious to us, as we must seek it out ourselves.

So where are we left? With the humbling appreciation that we can never see past our own subjectivity; with a sense of intellectual honesty; with respect for those with whom we disagree despite our own opinions; and conversely, with an empowered sense of obligation to follow truth as we see it despite recognizing the existence of other perspectives. As Rabbi Hayyim Angel writes12, " By definition we have objective and subjective components mixed into our perceptions…Somewhat paradoxically, apprehending this lack of true clarity may bring us one step closer toward gaining clarity in our ever-growing relationship with God." Recognizing the subjective nature of our world at once empowers us to follow our visions of truth while still letting us maintain an honest appreciation for other possible viewpoints.

But then again, you didn't need me to tell you that. Had I just finished the quote with which I opened, Hazal could have told you this far better than I could: "Hence… acquire for yourself a discerning heart to hear the words of those who declare impure and those who pronounce pure, the words of those who prohibit and the words of those who permit, and the words of those who disqualify and the words of those who declare fit."

May it be His will that we do.

Leor Hackel is a sophmore in YC

1 Almost all mekorot quoted here have been culled from the shiurim and research of mori ve-rabi HaRav Chaim Eisen shlit'a. Any merit in this article (which he has not seen) is his, and any error or misrepresentation is mine.

2 Eruvin 13b, stated regarding the dissensions between Beit Shamai and Beit Hille.l

3 Midrash Tehillim, perek 12.

4 The midrash makes this point clear in God's answer to Moshe: "acharei rabim l'hatot-if the majority declares impure it is impure, if they declare pure, it is pure." Apparently, the matter is undecided until we decide it. See also, among others: Tosfot Rabbeinu Peretz, who quotes this midrash; Maharsha (Chagiga 3b, s.v. Natnu ), who offers an almost identical interpretation; Rashi to Ketuvot 57a s.v. Ha Km"l and Rambam in Hakdama La-Mishna, who write that in a svara-based disagreement, neither side can be declared untrue.

5 Be'er Rishon.

6 Maharal (Derush al HaTorah) explicitly state this interpretation of the Gemara, though its context in Eruvin 13b and Midrash Tehillim perek 12 also highlight this non-legalistic aspect of the sheretz condition.

7 Yerushalmi Sanhedrin 4th perek, and Bavli Eruvin 13b. Significantly, this statement in Eruvin directly precedes the story of the heavenly voice declaring ailu ve-ailu. The context of the ailu ve-ailu along with the stories of Rabbi Meir recorded on the same amud, already point to a multiple-truths interpretation of ailu ve-ailu.

8 Machshevot Charutz, Section 19.

9 After all, despite his comments quoted above, Ramban continues in his introduction to Milkhemet Hashem: "But we will put forth all our effort and will have done enough in each machloket by pushing away one side with svarot that weigh against it; rejecting it through sugyot; and placing fortitude in the hands of the one who advances our side, from the pshat of the laws and logic of the sugyot, with agreement of the proper intellect. This is the goal of our efforts, and the intention of every scholar and God-fearer in the study of Gemara."

10 See, for example, Rabbeinu Yonah's commentary to Avot 1:1, s.v. "Hevu metunim."

11 Bava Metzia 59b.

12 Through an Opaque Lens, pg. 19. Sephardic Publication Foundation, Inc. New York . 2006